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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
MALWARE ANALYSIS WITH MACHINE LEARNING FOR EVALUATING
THE INTEGRITY OF MISSION CRITICAL DEVICES
by
Robert Heras
Florida International University, 2019
Miami, Florida
Professor Alexander Pons, Major Professor
The rapid evolution of technology in our society has brought great advantages, but
at the same time it has increased cybersecurity threats. At the forefront of these
threats is the proliferation of malware from traditional computing platforms to the
rapidly expanding Internet-of-things. Our research focuses on the development of a
malware detection system that strives for early detection as a means of mitigating
the effects of the malware’s execution.
The proposed scheme consists of a dual-stage detector providing malware detection for compromised devices in order to mitigate the devices malicious behavior.
Furthermore, the framework analyzes task structure features as well as the system
calls and memory access patterns made by a process to determine its validity and
integrity. The proposed scheme uses all three approaches applying an ensemble technique to detect malware. In our work we evaluate these three malware detection
strategies to determine their effectiveness and performance.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Motivation

Malware is often attributed as the cause for loss of data, data integrity, and financial damage for a company or institution. Due to the nature of malware and their
individual uniqueness, the determination of a compromise or infection can be daunting and difficult as well as challenging to determine exactly how much damage will
transpire because of it. There have been many advances in the industry including
the rise of the prominent internet-of-things (IoT). IoT includes sensors, actuators,
vehicles, home appliances and just about any device that are embedded with electronics in order to interconnect and exchange data. The increasing popularity of
these devices makes them inevitable targets for malicious corruption.
With the emergence and rising popularity of IoT and ubiquitous embedded systems it is increasingly common for them to be infected. Many IoT devices are
intended to be deployed to serve their function with little to no maintenance and
overhead required. Once deployed, many of these devices do not have enough battery or processing power to perform complex operations much less use standard
signature or heuristic methods to detect whether or not they have been infected and
compromised as it is too inefficient and costly to monitor at the device.
We propose a framework which uses an embedded low overhead agent in each
device to extract key feature data as the device is executing its tasks. This approach
allows our machine learning algorithms to make a determination as to whether a
device has been maliciously compromised by using behavioral analysis on extracted
features.
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The embedded agents connect to our remote framework in order to transfer
the harvested information and our models analyze this information to determine
the stability and integrity of each device. The analysis is done remotely and is
specific to each device so it is persistent and is dynamic enough that we can detect
various types of malware as they are executing even if the malware has attempted to
delay its execution. [RTWH11] These IoT devices typically maintain an operating
system, such as Android, and our system augments the OS with an agent that
collects execution features of running tasks in order to transmit them for analysis.
Other operating systems include Windows, Mac, and specific agents per operating
system would have to be generated. These agents have an inherent impact delay in
application execution as once the agent runs and at a specific rate, it will impact
the native application on the device. This process is conducted on an ongoing basis,
with the frequency and amount of information transmitted dependent on situational
conditions. Once the malicious activity is detected the device can be halted or the
task suspended from functioning within the network in order to prevent further
execution and the possible spread of the malware. Furthermore, our framework is
intended to work with as little overhead and interruption on the end devices. Figure
1.1 depicts an overview of our framework. The framework’s models are constructed
and maintained from features that are extracted from benign processes as they are
executing to provide an understanding of typical executions.
Novel research into new ways of detecting malicious activity is needed and it
is needed for a wide range of devices and device types. Researchers have looked
into the use of machine learning models in order to create anomaly detectors and
malware classifiers. [CLM01] Specifically the use of feature extraction, system call
extraction, and the observance of memory access patterns in order to train models
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that use algorithms such as Support Vector Machines, Random Forests, Logistic
Regression, and Naive Bayes.
From a Forensics standpoint, infected devices pose a myriad of difficulties. Devices can have their data altered, erased, or hidden. [UGPL18b] Forensics investigators must now also account for the rise of the prominent internet-of-things (IoT)
such as smart fridges and smart home air conditioning (AC) units.

Figure 1.1: Overview of our proposed framework depicting agents, IoT devices, and
remote classifier
To combat malware in both home and enterprise environments, we will attempt
to use machine learning via anomaly detection and decision tree classifier algorithms
to determine if a process is benign or malicious. The frameworks models are constructed and maintained from extracted task structure features, system calls, and
memory access patterns harvested from benign and malicious processes as they are
executing to provide an understanding of typical executions. The framework will
analyze this information to determine the stability and integrity of each device.

3

Once malicious activity is detected the device can be halted or the task suspended
from functioning in order to prevent further execution and the possible spread of the
malware. Furthermore, our framework is intended to work with as little overhead
and interruption on the end devices.
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CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY
Our framework functions by analyzing extracted features using a sliding window
approach for maximized accuracy. The values of our chosen task structure features,
system calls, and memory access patterns are harvested, combined into individual
vectors for the current sliding window, and then individually analyzed by our framework. While a malware may obfuscate what system calls it makes, it may not also
attempt to cloud what memory access patterns occur or forge its task structure
feature values. Using statistical probably built on the results of all three individual
models, our framework can accurately determine a processes nature with high true
positive rates and low false positives. This ensemble approach offers the maximum
coverage of a system and its processes and increases the likelihood of our framework
detecting malicious activity.
Our framework uses machine learning to analyze extracted features for the real
time detection of malware in deployed devices. We have seen the success of task
structure based feature extraction within a Windows [UGPL18a] and Linux environment [UGPL18b]. It has been shown that cloud-based services can provide security
to mobile phone devices with limited resources [DA13] and that behavioral based
malware detection systems can be used to detect anomalous activity [XZSZ10].
Hybrid approaches for anomaly detection with Hidden Markov Models and naive
Bayes models have also been explored and shown to be successful [DA13] [AHHT13]
[RTWH11], [XLQZ12].
Our approach differs from other tested approaches as we intend our framework to
use an ensemble of features, analyzed via a sliding window in order to be an accurate
and dynamic approach, focused on deployed devices. By extracting features from a
processes task structure and by observing the system calls [RRL+ 14] [FHSL96] and
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the memory access pattern [CCL+ 09] made, our framework can analyze a devices
behavior for anomalies. By observing all three features of a process, our framework
offers dynamic detection of malware. Through the use of sliding windows of vectors
created from these extracted features, we have increased accuracy for our models.
Furthermore, if an anomaly is detected then a more in-depth analysis occurs. Thus
far we have performed these extractions on Linux Kernel 4.10, Windows, and intend
to further test on Android and various IoT devices. The selection of the Linux
operating system as our target is based on the widespread use of Linux dialects for
many IoT devices.
Ubiquitous embedded systems or as they’re more commonly known, IoT devices,
are devices with the ability to transfer data over a network without requiring humanto-human or human-to-computer interaction. They have sensors and tend to collect
data or act on received information. Such devices are perfect targets for malicious
activity. Due to the nature of our framework, a potential application of the basic
technology works well for deployed IoT devices. Most IoT devices run commandline interface (CLI) applications and therefore this study aims to build a malware
detector for these types of application, as GUI based applications that exist for
user interactions are not the norm for IoT devices. IoT devices will also have a
minimal number of applications, if not only one. We can focus on verifying one
application or a minimal number of applications in an IoT device being monitored.
Furthermore, as we know what application(s) are running on an IoT device type,
we can develop the anomaly detection models and use them to detect an attack
(prior to the device being deployed) since we know the processes running on that
specific IoT device. Figure 2.1 depicts the numerous phases of the classification
process. Through the frameworks use of drivers, the feature data is first observed
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and extracted. Then the extracted data is formatted for the model and the classifier
performs its classification.

Figure 2.1: A flow diagram depicting the numerous phases of the classification
process

2.0.1

Task structure Feature Extraction

For the purposes of malware detection with machine learning via feature extraction,
a feature is a system property which should deviate greatly when observed from a
benign process versus a malicious process. Each process is manifested in the OS
through a data structure called task structure that maintains on an ongoing bases
all information associated with the process, like open files, network activity, memory
region, time spent in user and kernel space and many more. All of the information
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that is required to move a process from a running state to a waiting state and
at a later time to the running state without affecting the process execution. By
observing and cataloging the values of these task structure features, we can map the
normal operating procedure the system has and observe any deviations as possibly
malicious. The research performed in [SBSF11] determined 11 out of 118 feature
which can discriminate between a benign and malicious process with high accuracy,
as depicted in Figure 2.2. Within a Linux operating system, a feature logger was
used which periodically dumped 118 fields of task structure data every millisecond
for 15 seconds. The results of the experiments performed show that a classification
decision can be made within the first 100 instances as the process’s execution enters
a steady state afterwards. The classification power of using task structures for
malware analysis is shown as the results were 93% accuracy with minimal overhead,
from 50 to 70 microseconds after every millisecond [SBSF11].
For our framework, we opted to extract the eleven identified features every millisecond over the course of fifteen seconds. The eleven features selected showed the
most discrepancy between benign and malicious activity out of the identified 118
features. Extractions at a rate less than one millisecond didn’t contain enough discrepancy when compared to extractions performed at a rate of one millisecond but
caused more overhead due to more extractions over the given 15 second window.
Extractions at a rate over one millisecond began to lose their discrepancy and thus
resulted in less accuracy. Furthermore, we compared the extracted features of command line interface applications against graphical user interface applications. Due
to the event based nature of graphical user interface applications, the models lost
accuracy when they were trained on mostly command line interface applications and
vice versa. To ensure consistent accuracy, a broad spectrum of applications must be
used to train the models.
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Figure 2.2: Eleven identified task structure features with the greatest disparity when
Benign vs. Malicious [SBSF11]
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Of the extracted features, one to note is map count which is an integer value
depicting the number of memory regions. Figure 2.3 clearly denoted the disparity
between the map count value of a benign and malicious program execution. The
feature hiwater rss is the high-water of resident set size usage which is used to show
how much memory is allocated to that process and is in random access memory.
The utime feature depicts how much time a process spends in user space where
as the stime feature represents how much time a process spends in kernel space.
Each feature in a processes task structure has a purpose and value which can denote its maliciousness. In order to achieve our observations depicted in Figure 2.3,
we observed the task structure of various benign processes and various malicious
processes and harvested all eleven features. For each benign and malicious process,
we graphed the average map count value at each interval of extraction resulting in
Figure 2.3; denoting that the map count value for a benign process deviates from
the standard map count value for a malicious process. It is worth noting that our
other ten extracted features behaved similarly and support the research performed
in [SBSF11].
We determined 11 out of 118 task structure feature which can discriminate
between a benign and malicious process with high accuracy [SBSF11]. The features we have identified are extracted using a device driver or through introspection
[UGPL18b] [SBSF11] and used to train and test our model. These features are then
used to audit the running system and perform monitoring on system performance
[ZZSL15]. Table 2.1 depicts twelve possible features that can be extracted of the
identified 118 in [SBSF11]. Utime for instance is the amount of time that a process
spends in userspace. Conversely, stime is the amount of time a process spend in
kernelspace. Map count is an integer value depicting the number of memory regions
used by the process. Each feature serves a specific purpose within the task structure
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Figure 2.3: Time series statistics of the map count task structure feature of a Benign
vs. Malicious process
of a process and the features value can denote whether that process is benign or
malicious. The observations of such features offers a basis for the behavioral analysis
of a deployed device.
Table 2.1: Twelve possible Task Structure Features as identified by [SBSF11]
fscount
exec vm
map count min flt
nvcsm
stime

hiwater rss hiwater vm
nlvcsm
nr ptes
total vm
utime

In [ZZSL15], a Feature Extraction and Selection Tool (FEST) was developed
which used a feature-based machine learning approach for malware detection and
tested on Android platforms. The researchers developed a means to look at the
permissions, API actions, IP, and URLs within an android apk and using statistical
analysis, collect the features they wish to use. The data-set contained 7972 apps with
50% being malware and the rest being benign. From their research, they discovered
that the performance of the Naive Bayes (NB) algorithm is the worst of all algorithms
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because of its strictly independence limitation and continued further testing with
the K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) and the Support Vector Machines (SVM) algorithms
which displayed increased accuracy.
Researchers have also compared the performance of Naive Bayes (NB), Random
Forests (RF), and Support Vector Machines(SVM) and determined that the Random Forest algorithm had better classification of malware [JS17]. This was tested
with 10-fold cross validation over a sample set of 25 benign and 84 malicious samples. The detection rate for their approach was calculated using five metrics, True
Positive Rate (TPR), False Positive Rate (FPR), Precision, Recall, and Accuracy.
For static analysis, the Random Forest classifiers had an accuracy of 69.72% and
was closely followed by Naive Bayes classifiers with an accuracy of 68.23%. With
dynamic analysis, the Random Forest classifiers provided 63.3% accuracy and while
the closest other classifier was the Support Vector Machines (SVM) with 60.55%
accuracy. Overall, SVM was showed to have a better accuracy than Naive Bayes
and Random Forest had the most accuracy among all the classifiers tested.
Evasion of feature extraction based detection might seem possible, however can
be quite difficult. [SBSF11] found that the accuracy of their model is unacceptable
once eight features are forged, however each parameter depends on a particular
configuration of the system - cache, RAM, paging, etc. The values can change
from one host to another so a malicious actor must first estimate the values for
a particular system and to do so would require the execution of a malware which
hooks into sample fields for benign processes. In Linux, this is only allowed to super
user processes and as such, a malicious process would be unable to easily evade a
feature extraction based malware analysis.
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2.0.2

System Call Extraction

Instead of using feature extraction for task structure, researchers have focused on
analyzing system calls as an alternative. System calls allow user level applications to
interact with the kernel and benign processes interact with the kernel differently than
malicious ones. By observing the system calls a process makes, we can determine
if it is operating within normal functionality or if it acting in a malicious manner.
Such research as in [CMK15b] compares the accuracy of n-gram analysis to that
of bag-of-n-grams as well as ordered and unordered 2-gram representations of the
system call trace.
The conclusion of the [CMK15b] showed that the best extraction techniques used
a minimum system call trace length of 1,000 ordered 3-grams chosen using recursive
feature elimination (RFE). Recursive feature elimination (RFE) is a feature selection
method that fits a model and removes the weakest features until the specified number
of features are reached. The algorithms with the highest accuracy were Logistic
Regression (LR) and Support Vector Machine (SVM) which outperformed signaturebased detectors. For classification, the Random Forest (RF), K-Nearest Neighbor
(KNN), and Logistic Regression (LR) algorithms provided the highest accuracy,
outperforming Naive Bayes (NB) and Nearest Centroid Classifier (NCC).
Along side task structure features, we observe the system calls executed by a process. System call extraction has been explored on various platforms such as Hadoop
[LHC11], QEMU [BSM13], Android [XLQZ12] [JMJ18], and within Linux using
a Loadable Kernel Module (LKM) [SN08] to protect against kernel level rootkits
[DGSTG09]. Our framework uses a form of introspection, similar to the extraction
of task structure features, in order to extract the system calls made by a process.
After testing, we have opted to format our extracted system calls into 3-gram chunks
instead of using an approach like bag-o-words for a higher accuracy within our sliding
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window [CMK15a] [CMK15b] [FT17]. Figure 2.4 depicts the fundamental difference
between 1-gram (unigrams), 2-gram (bigrams), and 3-gram (trigrams).

Figure 2.4: Depiction of the fundamental differences in n-gram sizes
The program we use to collect system calls is strace which is a diagnostic and
debugging utility for Linux. It is used to monitor and tamper with interactions
between processes and the Linux kernel. The strace output is a list of system calls
made by a running process for a given duration. Each line in the trace contains the
system call name, followed by its arguments in parentheses and its return value. For
example ”open(”/dev/null”, O RDONLY) = 3” is one of the outputs of the open
system call when I ran the command ”cat /dev/null”. For our purposes, we need
the system call made and not the parameters or the return value. This is list of
calls is then formatted into 3-grams. Figure 2.5 depicts the 3-gram formatting of
extracted system calls into vectors that are used by the machine learning models.
These overlapping system calls provide a depiction of the systems running state and
by observing them in order, we can determine behavioral patterns.
Within [CMK15a], more exploration was done including Naive Bayes, SVMs, decision trees, and neural networks. System calls extracted and compiled into 3-gram
with a trace length of 1500 calls and compared against a LR, RF, and SVM classi-
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Figure 2.5: Depiction of 3-gram Formatting of extracted System Calls
fier. According to the results, the worst performing classifiers were Naive Bayes and
nearest centroid conversely nearest neighbor and random forest classifiers providing
nearly identical performance. The LR classifier performed similarly to the nearest
neighbor and the random forest classifier, however the LR performance degraded
significantly when the feature reduction techniques singular value decomposition
(SVD) and linear discriminant analysis (LDA) were used. Classifier accuracy was
shown to improve when n was increased, in particular there was a large increase in
performance when moving from 1-gram to 2-gram indicating that the frequency information about system calls alone is insufficient for classification. At a trace length
of 1500, the average execution time of the studied processes was 205 ms. This result
indicates that high classification accuracy was achievable during the initial execution of the malware samples. As noted by the author, for a production deployment
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of a classification system, the LR classifier is preferred to the random forest and
nearest neighbor.
Research into system calls is an ever expanding niche. [CMK15b] tested bagof-2-gram representations of system call traces with the use of sliding windows.
The ordered 2-gram representation considers the local ordering of the calls within
the sliding window, whereas the unordered 2-gram representation ignores the local
ordering. For n size 2, 3, and 4 the LR and SVM detectors offered significantly
improved detection performance while LR and SVM detectors peaked around 1000
system calls for n sizes of three and four indicating that the studied malware sampled
were detected during the early stages of their execution. The research further shows
the results of testing a LR detector trained with 10-fold cross validation and n-gram
sizes of three, containing 3,500 ordered system calls. Figure 2.6 shows the maximum
true positive rate (TPR) as varying sequence lengths.

Figure 2.6: Maximum True Positve Rate and False Positive Rate at a sequence
length of {1, 2, 3, 4} and system call trace lengths [250, 1500][CMK15b]
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Malware analysis on Windows and Linux has been explored however in [LHC11]
the Hadoop platform was tested. Using a system calls analysis method with MapReduce, the Hadoop platform is used to analyze the system calls on a server rather
than on the clients side. The author also proposes a more universal and persistent
model to correlate system calls among modules. Some limitations with this research
is if a persistent malware’s behavior is completed without the use of system calls
then the approach fails to detect the malware. Another limitation is that the cost
of data transmission required to have the server analyze the collected system calls
has not been measured. The research demonstrated the ability to improve upon
previous research which resulted in a 28% increase in detection rate.
Within [BSM13], we see the use of QEMU-emulated sandbox’s virtual hard drive
where the program Procmon was responsible for collecting system call information
for all processes. Once collected, the system calls were analyzed and compared two
at a time in a sliding window format. Specifically, the research used Jaccard distance
due to good results and clear semantics. However, some limitations encountered was
with the restrictions of a virtualized sandbox. Because some of the malware samples
were unable to connect to the internet, some of their behavior may have gone unseen
and at times malware may even terminate early resulting in insufficient traces which
could lead to poorer results.
In [SN08], the researchers develop a lightweight monitoring infrastructure which
extracts runtime information from the Linux kernel for the purpose of enhancing
system reliability. The loadable kernel module titled KOMI observes the guest OS
and intercepts system calls’ to collect information from the kernel and suggests
strategies to audit and protect the kernel with minimal CPU overhead. The researchers found the monitoring service easy to customize with minimal penalty to
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Table 2.2: [SN08] System Call Interception Overhead from KOMI
System Calls
null
read
write

Linux
(microsec)
4.0172
4.4833
4.2613

KOMI
(microsec)
4.0173
4.4833
4.2615

performance allowing for easy integration into existing embedded systems. The
interception overhead between Linux and KOMI is depicted in Table 2.2.
In [ZLK+ 07], a Loadable Kernel Module (LKM) is proposed as part of a secure
auditing system in which system calls are intercepted in order to suggest strategies
to audit and protect the kernel. Within [DGSTG09], a system is proposed with
the intention of protecting the OS kernel from rootkits which hide their respective
running processes and threads. This is done by generating signatures for the kernel’s
data structure and building a profile using this observed data. Twenty applications
were tested and 221 fields were observed, 32 of which were never accessed during the
execution of the profiled applications. The research encourages a systematic way of
determining which features should be used when determining a data structure for
research which extends to machine learning based applications.
With the expansion of embedded systems, smartphones are at risk as well. In
[JMJ18], dynamic analysis was performed on an android device using system call
extraction. System calls for twenty normal applications and forty malicious applications were recorded for thirty seconds and then sixty seconds while the total
amount of times in which the system calls were made was observed and recorded.
For example, the epoll wait operation was called 2613 times by a benign application conversely to 4703 times from a malicious application. Similarly, clock gettime
was called 3796 times by a benign application and 17,251 times by a malicious one.
Of note, malicious applications also request high-level permission from users in or-
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der to compromise the system by exploiting the granted permission. The research
shows that observed system calls made by malicious applications can be used to
create a signature to detect malware and although this research does not include
machine learning components, it proved that the analyzing of system calls can aid
in determining whether a system has been exploited.
In a similar research, [XLQZ12], a Hidden Markov Model was used with system
call extraction and key press patterns in order to attempt malware detection on a
smartphone; which showed promise. Specifically, 108 system calls were obtained
and graphed as shown in Figure 2.7 where y1 =zp is the benign process and y2 =yp is
the malicious process, showing that system calls can be used to accurately classify
a process using a Hidden Markov Model (HMM).

2.0.3

Memory Access Pattern

While feature and system call extractions have been shown to accurately detect
whether a process is benign or malicious, other researchers have begun to explore the
same functionality using memory access patterns. Memory access patterns are the
patterns in which a system reads and writes data to secondary storage and random
access memory. Our framework focuses specifically on virtual memory access rather
than physical memory access. By observing what virtual memory access is done by
a process and analyzing what portions of virtual memory are interacted with, we
can determine if a process has been tampered with. The collected data is compiled,
similar to the 3-gram approach of our system calls, and then passed to our first
stage detector.
An epoch is the date and time relative to which a computer’s clock and timestamp values are determined. Virtual memory is divided into memory regions based
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Figure 2.7: Results of Malware detection using a Hidden Markov Model [XLQZ12]
on the systems epoch which are used to build the systems memory model according to the type and frequency of access within these memory regions. Operating
systems use pages which are the smallest fixed-length contiguous blocks of virtual
memory possible. These pages are allocated together into a page frame which is the
smallest fixed-length block of physical memory to which the pages are mapped to.
[XRSM17]
In this case, memory addresses are observed for changes that deviate from the
norm in order to classify the process invoking the memory access. In [XRSM17],
a novel framework is developed which includes techniques for collecting and summarizing memory access patterns. The framework also functions on a two-level
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Table 2.3: Details of the performance of our memory access patterns model
Benign
Malware
Average/Total

Precision
0.40
0.89
0.84

Recall
0.02
1.0
0.89

F1-score
0.03
0.94
0.85

Support
93
777
866

classification architecture and observes kernel rootkits vs user-level malware and
contains epoch-based monitoring. Thus far, ten rootkits have been observed using
QEMU with the machine learning algorithms having been trained on four of those
rootkits and asked to detect six rootkits it has never seen before. The two algorithms tested were Random Forest and Logistic Regression and both showed great
accuracy and demonstrated the framework could detect new malware.
For our purposes, we use a program called Perf to observe memory access. The
output contains references such as “LFB hit” or L1 or L2 hit” or “Local RAM hit”.
These ”hits” are memory access events that occur for both read and write events.
Observing their order and occurrence gives us a standard for normal behavior when
observing benign processes. We also observe whether these memory access patterns
occur in userspace vs. kernel space. Each type of ”hit” is given a correlating
numerical value (”LFB hit” = 1, ”L1 or L2 hit” = 2, etc) and this formatted output
is used to train our models. Because of the limited number of occurrence types that
exist (”LFB hit”, ”L1 or L2 hit”, etc), it is viable to observe these for behavioral
analysis.

2.0.4

Data Extraction Process

For task structure feature extraction, we used a loadable kernel module which hooked
into the kernel and intercepted task structure features when a process was executing.
These features were stored in a buffer as the process was observed in its running
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state and then the buffer was saved to a file. The resulting feature values were
stored as a comma-delimited file and compiled together to train our task structure
models. Because each process that is observed creates it’s own output file, there is
a resulting abundance of data files. As part of our framework we also developed a
program to compile all the extracted task structure feature files into one file which
could be used to train our machine learning models. Table 2.4 depicts six of the
eleven task structure features we extracted using our loadable kernel module. The
rows are a sampling of the values these features can have which create a vector that
is then analyzed by our models, {F1 , F2 , . . . , Fn }. Table 2.4 denotes the first three
sampled vectors of a benign process while Table 2.5 denotes the first three sampled
vectors of a malicious process. A comparison of both tables depicts the disparity
between a benign and malicious process.
Table 2.4: First three task structure feature values from a benign process as extracted using our loadable kernel module

Class
Benign
Benign
Benign

map count
1
8
16

hiwater rss
0
1
1

hiwater vm
0
1052
1865

total vm
33
546
1865

exec vm
0
503
770

nr ptes
1
5
8

Table 2.5: First three task structure feature values from a malicious process as
extracted using our loadable kernel module

Class
Malware
Malware
Malware

map count
37
42
48

hiwater rss
188
192
202

hiwater vm
3948
4143
4258

total vm
6484
6484
6484

exec vm
1251
1256
1261

nr ptes
16
16
32

In order to extract the system calls performed by a process we used a program
called strace. Strace is a diagnostic and debugging userspace utility for Linux which
is used to monitor and tamper with interactions between processes and the kernel
via system calls. Strace is a intercepts and records the system calls made by a
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process and the signals which are received as a result. The name of the system
call, its arguments, and its return value are all printed to data files. The extracted
system calls must be parsed and our framework does this by iterating through each
line in the data files and extracting each call. The calls are then compiled into a
vector of three calls per vector as depicted in Figure 2.5.
The memory access patterns of the benign cli application and malicious executable listed in Table 2.3, are obtained using an application called Perf. This tool
is a performance analyzing utility within Linux which provides a number of subcommands that allow statistical profiling of the entire system. The commands used
in conjunction with this tool recorded both read and write memory access events
and outputted them to text files for further processing/formatting. These memory
accesses were captured with their parameters and were outputted one per line. Table 2.6 depicts three lines of extracted memory access patterns though we have only
included seven of the thirteen available data columns that are outputted by Perf.
The symbol column describes if the memory hit is occurring in userspace as depicted
by ”[.]” or in kernelspace as depicted by ”[k]”. The object column can inform us
if a memory access event is occurring in the heap or the stack. The last column,
”TLB access” describes the unique hits that occur to the translation lookaside buffer
(TLB) which is a memory cache that is used to reduce the time taken to access a
memory location.
Table 2.6: Example extracted memory access patterns for a benign application
Access Type
read
read
write

Overhead
1.41%
1.37%
0.53%

Samples
1
1
1

Local Weight
2516
2444
940

Memory Access
LFB hit
LFB hit
Local RAM hit

Symbol
[.]
[.]
[k]

Object
anon
[heap]
[kernel.kallsyms]

TLB access
L1 or L2 hit
L2 or L3 hit
L1 or L2 hit

Our framework formats and compiles all the memory accesses into readable data
for our model. The formatter within our framework iterates through each line of
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the file created from the extraction phase and first adds necessary spacing in order
to distinguish between features/columns. It then formats each column in the file by
representing each possible value for each parameter by a number ranging from 1 to
n, with n being the total number of possible values that parameter can take. Once
each value has been replaced with a corresponding number, the script continues to
iterate through the remaining lines in the file and performs the same actions on
the data. The formatted file is then input to the machine learning models to make
predictions as to whether or not a specified process is malicious. It operates by
creating numerous decision trees during training.

2.0.5

Machine Learning Models

Figure 2.8: Two dimensional depiction of a Support Vector Machine (SVM) algorithm
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A Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a discriminating classifier which separates
occurrences into two spaces. In two dimensional space, this can be described as a
line dividing a plane in two parts where each class lays on either side of the line.
Figure 2.8 is a two dimensional depiction of a Support Vector Machine algorithm,
it’s margins, and it’s decision boundaries, as well as where class data and outliers
occur. Support vector machines are supervised learning models that can be used
to analyze data, recognize patterns, and can be used for both classification and
regression tasks. This model is particularly useful where there is much benign data
and not much anomalous activity that you are trying to detect, often the case for
malware. A fine example of when to use a support vector machine is to detect
fraudulent transactions where you might not have many examples of fraud but you
can train your classification model on an abundance of good transactions. This is
useful for anomaly detection because the scarcity of training examples are exactly
what define an anomaly: that is, something that deviates from what is standard,
normal, or expected.
A Random Forest algorithm is another type of supervised learning classifier
which creates a forest of decisions by some way and randomizes it. There is also a
direct correlation between the number of trees and the classifiers accuracy with a
larger number of trees resulting in a more accurate model. A few advantage of using
the Random Forest algorithm are that the classifier won’t overfit the model, the
algorithm can handle missing values well, it can be modeled for categorical values,
and it can be used for both classification and regression tasks. Figure 2.9 depicts
the decision tree classifier of a Random Forest algorithm.
Logistic Regression is a technique originating from the field of statistics. It is a
classification algorithm used to assign observations to a discrete set of classes. The
Logistic Regressions algorithm transforms its output using a sigmoid function and
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Figure 2.9: Depiction of a decision tree classifier of a Random Forest algorithm
returns the probability value which can be mapped to two discrete classes. Often it
is a go-to method for problems with only two classes such as benign and malicious,
also known as a binary classification problem. The algorithm is depicted as an Sshaped curve, otherwise known as the boundary, where values are mapped to either
side of the curve. Figure 2.10 depicts a Logistic Regression algorithm, it’s boundary,
as well as true and false samples.
K-fold cross-validation is a statistical method used to estimate the skill of machine learning models. When applied to models it often results in estimates are
generally less biases than other methods. The original sample is randomly partitioned into k equal sizes of sub-samples, in our case ten. Of these ten sub-samples,
a single sample is kept as the validation data for testing the model while the remaining nine samples are used as training data. The cross-validation process is then
repeated ten times with each of the ten sub-samples used exactly once as validation
data. The ten results are then averaged to produce a single estimation of the models
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Figure 2.10: Depiction of Logistic Regression algorithm including the boundary and
true/false samples
accuracy. The advantage of this technique over repeated random sampling is that
all the samples are used for both training and validation and each sample is used
only once for validation. Furthermore, in repeated cross-validation the data is randomly split into k folds several times. The performance of the model can therefore
be averages over several runs. The goal is also to test a models ability to predict
new data that was not used in estimating it in order to indicate problems such as
over-fitting or selection bias and to give insight into how the model will independently generalize a dataset. Due to the aforementioned details of cross-validation,
we used 10-fold cross-validation as our validation technique for our Random Forest
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Figure 2.11: Depiction k-fold cross validation and training for machine learning
models
and Logistic Regression models. Figure 2.11 depicts k-fold cross-validation as it
is used to validate machine learning models such as Random Forest and Logistic
Regression.

2.0.6

Ensemble Comparison

Our framework uses feature extraction of task structure properties, system calls, and
memory access patterns in order to facilitate a multi-pronged approach to malware
detection and analysis. The task structure of a process describes the shared resources
used such as an address space or open files. The kernel stores the list of processes
in a linked list and each process contains a task structure which contains all the
information about that specific process. System calls are the fundamental interface
between an application and the Linux kernel and are invoked to perform an action.
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Some common system calls are read, write, and open. A memory access pattern is
the pattern with which a system or program reads and writes memory to secondary
storage.
We have identified various features within a Linux environment whose values
deviate sufficiently over time when they are benign or malicious. These features
consist of the smallest subset possible to provide detection of malware [SBSF11]
[CMK15b] [XRSM17]. These features were selected after much testing and observation to determine their deviance in value when they were benign or malicious. Thus
far we have performed these extractions on Linux Kernel 4.10, and intend to further
test on Windows, Android, and various IoT devices. The selection of the Linux
operating system as our target is based on the widespread use of Linux dialects for
many IoT devices.
Our task structure, system call, and memory access features are harvested individually and across different system times. A vector is a collection of extracted
features of a given feature type (task structure, system calls, memory access). Each
vector has a given formatting requirement given which feature type it belongs to.
For instance, task structure and memory access vectors are a collection of extracted
features {F1 , F2 , . . . , Fn } while system calls are 3-gram representations of extracted
system call features {Call1 , Call2 , Call3 }. These vectors are independent of each
other and there is a respective support vector machine, random forest, and logistic
regression model for each feature type as they cannot be classified with a shared
model. When sufficient vectors of a given feature type are collected, the vectors are
passed to our models for analysis, regardless of the status of other feature type vectors. This results in independent collection time and data sampling for each feature
type. If all feature types return a benign classification for their respective vectors
then a device is considered to be benign. If any of the vectors are classified as
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malicious, then the device is exhibiting suspicious behavior. It is worth noting that
a malware may attempt to spoof one of its feature types such as its task structure
but may not attempt to spoof all three feature types at the same time resulting in
a more resilient IoT device.

2.0.7

Dual-Stage Classification

Dual-level classification architectures have been shown to be successful in classifying
malware [XRSM17] [Yua17]. Besides classifying many aspects of a process, our
framework uses a dual-stage approach. Our first stage is an anomaly detector which
has been trained solely on benign data and is highly sensitive. Our second stage
occurs if the sliding window is found to be anomalous after being analyzed by our
anomaly detector (first stage). It is passed to our classifier which has been trained on
both benign and malicious data. This classifier attempts a more in-depth analysis
to further assess the window as benign or malicious and makes a decision. Our
first stage can mark a task as suspicious, limiting its execution, while the second
stage will perform a more in-depth analysis to fully determine the intent of the
task. Figure 2.12 is a workflow diagram of our ensemble features using a dual-stage
analysis approach. Our framework contains a one-class support vector machine, a
random forest, and a logistic regression model for each of our feature types (task
structure, system calls, and memory access patterns) which analyze independently
of each other. A vector is first passed to the one-class support vector machine and
if the vector is determined not to be benign, the vector is passed to both of our
random forest and logistic regression models for comparison. The one-class support
vector machine is trained solely on benign datasets and the random forest and
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logistic regression models are trained on the same dataset containing both benign
and malicious samples.
Once a stage-one alert is identified the agent will be notified to extract more
data and to monitor more features in an effort to pass the additional information to
stage-two before final determination is taken. A Quasi-malware state is a state in
which a device has limited performance and network impact while it in in an intermediate evaluation state. The agent on the deployed device can be informed after
a stage-one alert in order to restrict or modify various aspects of the device (Quasimalware state) prior to the stage-two determination in order to prevent further
malicious behavior or the propagation of malware. If stage-two finds no malware
the agent is informed to return to normal operations. Throughout the process a
visual representation of the networked devices is maintained denoting the health of
these devices. A key feature of our dual stage approach is its ability to be diverse
enough to accommodate the varying degrees of configuration of deployed devices.
This diverse nature enables our first stage to function with a different sliding window size and threshold than our second stage. The first stage can be configured to
analyze a sliding window and threshold that has been shown to be overly sensitive
while our second stage can be configured for accuracy.

2.0.8

Sliding Windows and Thresholds

Sliding window validation is the process of backtesting time series models by dividing
the whole cross-sectional dataset into different training windows by specifying the
width of these windows. The model is trained using the training window and applied
the testing window in order to compute the performance of the first run. The
training window slides to a new set of training records and the process is repeated
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Figure 2.12: Flow chart of ensemble approach including dual-stage classification
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until all training windows are used. Using this technique for training, the average
performance metric can be calculated across the entire dataset. The performance
metric derived through the use of sliding window validation is generally more robust
than split validation testing. Because of the improved robustness and accuracy of
this mathematical technique, we implement sliding windows in the testing of our
extracted features.
To improve the accuracy and robustness of our analysis, our framework implements sliding windows in its analysis of data. The values of our chosen features are
harvested, combined into a vector for the current sliding window, and then transmitted to our framework. The sliding window is comprised of a set of vectors {V1 ,
V2 , . . . , Vn } where n determines the size of the window. Now, each vector Vx is
composed of a set of features {F1 , F2 , . . . , Fm } where m denotes the last feature
extracted from the defined feature set. The threshold within the sliding window
is what percentage of the sliding window must be determined in order to make a
determination for the entire window. For example a sliding window of size ten with
a threshold of eighty percent requires eight of the ten vectors to be of a certain type
before making the determination that the sliding window is of that type.
If we intent to use a sliding window of size ten for our task structure features we
would include ten vectors, in other words ten rows of {F1 , F2 , . . . , Fn }. For system
calls with 3-grams it would be ten rows of {Call1 , Call2 , Call3 } and for memory
access it would be ten rows of memory hits {Hit1 , Hit2 , . . . , Hitn }. The sliding
window sizes can also be independent of each other, in other words, task structure
analysis can have a sliding window size of ten while system calls use a sliding window
size of five. Figure 2.13 depicts a sliding window vector over time.
The accuracy of a sliding window correlates to the selected window size and
the selected threshold. A window size that is too large with a low threshold may
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Figure 2.13: Attribute vector summarizing a sliding time window of frames
be too quick to make a determination for such a large window. This can result in
inaccuracies especially with delayed malware which displays its execution later in the
sliding window. Similarly a large sliding window with a high threshold must classify
many vectors in order to make a determination. Classifying many vectors requires
more processing time and such a high threshold may result in the determination
being made late into the window. Comparably a sliding window that is too small
may lack the required size to make an accurate determination of the devices running
state. We have found that varying window sizes have different accuracy with various
thresholds as shown in Figure 2.14 which demonstrates the accuracy for various
sliding window sizes and thresholds when tested for our task structure.
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Figure 2.14: Accuracy of our various tested sliding window sizes and thresholds

2.0.9

Framework Validation

To validate our proposed framework we implemented our feature extraction within
an x86 Linux environment and referred to [UGPL18b][UGPL18a] For the implementation of our framework the deployed devices not only have an embedded agent
installed but the machine learning models would be trained at the manufacturer
level. Before the device is deployed the devices would be run and analyzed in a
secure environment and a map of their standard operating procedures would be
developed. Our framework would be trained on this map for that device model so
when the device is deployed it is ready to function with a model specific to it. In
[UGPL18a] the authors showed success with various traditional machine learning
algorithms such as support vector machines, random forest, and logistic regression.
Because of this in our x86 Linux environment we used a one-class support vector
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machine as the model for our anomaly detection within our first stage. Within our
second stage we used a random forest and logistic regression classifier to do our
in-depth analysis.
A key feature of our dual stage approach is its ability to be diverse enough to
accommodate the varying degrees of configuration of deployed devices and various
classification algorithms. This allows a wide range of classification algorithms to be
configured as many have been shown to have varying degrees of success for malware
detection dependent on the devices environment [SBSF11] [Yua17] [JS17].
In order to combat malware, our methods of detection must improve. One possible approach is to use a dual stage classifier. The RansHunt framework shown in
[Yua17] works on static and dynamic features and includes a multi-stage approach
with a Support Vector Machine based algorithm. The framework is trained with
10-fold cross validation and uses Cuckoo Sandbox in the back-end for dynamic malware analysis. In the preliminary results, the Deep learning model with 2-tuple
inputs achieved 94.83% accuracy. To improve detection time, system call traces
were compressed and in all cases the RansHunt framework performed better than
most anti-malware methods.
Similarly, [XRSM17] includes a two-level classification architecture which analyzes kernel rootkits versus user-level malware and uses n-gram attribute similarity
(AS). Feature vectors of byte code are extracted and arranged into n-grams and
tested against various algorithms for their accuracy and true positive rate (TPR).
The researchers tested three data sets, the first of which was collected in 2014
and contained 88 malwares and 84 benigns. The second dataset is from 2015 and
contained 200 malwares and 168 benigns while the third dataset consisted of 1000
malwares and benigns from the Open Malware Benchmark. The first data set was
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Table 2.7: [XRSM17] Experiment Results of Dataset 2
True Positive (%) Accuracy (%)
AS
95.4
92.61
C4.5
90.7
91.30
Naive Bayes 89.95
91.00
BayesNet
91.65
91.66
SVM
82.15
88.78
Table 2.8: [XRSM17] Experimental Results of Dataset 3
True Positive (%) Accuracy (%)
AS
86.69
81.07
C4.5
58.64
59.7
Naive Bayes 37.63
68.31
BayesNet
52.15
74.67
SVM
42.9
70.93
used for training and the second and third datasets were used as test data, the
results of which are detailed in Table 2.7 and Table 2.8.
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Due to our ensemble approach, our framework relies on various machine learning
models, specifically one-class support vector machine, random forest, and logistic
regression. The one-class support vector machine is our anomaly detector and as
such was trained solely on benign data. Our random forest and logistic regression
models are our classifiers trained using 10-fold cross-validation and were trained on
the same set of benign and malicious processes.
For task structure features, the random forest model had a model result mean
of 99.98% and an accuracy of 100%. The task structure logistic regression model
had a model result mean of 65.98% and an accuracy of 65.35%. Table 3.1 displays
the classification report of the task structure random forest model while Table 3.2
displays the classification report of the task structure logistic regression model.
Table 3.1: Details of the Task Structure Random Forest model.
Benign
Malware
Average/Total

Precision
1.00
1.00
1.00

Recall
1.00
1.00
1.00

F1-score
1.00
1.00
1.00

Support
481
890
1371

Table 3.2: Details of the Task Structure Logistic Regression model.
Benign
Malware
Average/Total

Precision
0.50
1.00
0.83

Recall
1.00
0.47
0.65

F1-score
0.66
0.64
0.65

Support
471
900
1371

For system calls, the random forest had a result mean of 99.40% and an accuracy
of 99.42% while the logistic regression had a result mean of 98.82% and an accuracy
of 98.92%. The classification report for system calls of both the random forest and
the logistic regression models can be found on Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, respectively.
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Table 3.3: Details of the System Call Random Forest model.
Benign
Malware
Average/Total

Precision
0.99
1.00
0.99

Recall
1.00
0.46
0.99

F1-score
1.00
0.63
0.99

Support
6143
67
6210

Table 3.4: Details of the System Call Logistic Regression model.
Benign
Malware
Average/Total

Precision
0.99
1.00
0.98

Recall
1.00
0.48
0.99

F1-score
0.99
0.64
0.98

Support
6143
67
6210

For memory access pattern analysis, the random forest model displayed a result mean of 87.64% and an accuracy of 89.14%. The logistic regression model for
the memory access pattern approach displayed a result mean off 87.67% and an
accuracy of 89.26%. Table 3.5 demonstrates the classification report of the memory
access pattern based random forest model while Table 3.6 demonstrated the logistic
regression model.
Table 3.5: Details of the Memory Access Patterns Random Forest model.
Benign
Malware
Average/Total

Precision
0.49
0.89
0.84

Recall
0.02
1.00
0.89

F1-score
0.04
0.94
0.85

Support
93
773
866

When classifying a process as a whole, on average across all three techniques,
our one-class support vector machine had an accuracy of 86% served as our anomaly
detector. Due to our dual-stage approach, the remaining 14% of unknown or malicious occurrences were passed to our random forest and logistic regression models
for further classification at which point either model came to its own respective
classification for the tested data. In total, our random forest and logistic regression
models showed overall more accuracy than our one-class support vector machine
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Table 3.6: Details of the Memory Access Patterns Logistic Regression model.
Benign
Malware
Average/Total

Precision
0.40
0.89
0.80

Recall
0.02
1.00
0.89

F1-score
0.03
0.94
0.84

Support
93
773
866

model however required more time to classify the data. By using our anomaly detector as a first stage, we reserved in-depth classification and overhead to only the
processes that truly required it.
Table 3.7 lists some benign and malicious processes which were used for the
testing of our models. We attempted to use processes which produced a minimum
of 1000 task structure vectors, 100 system call vectors, 100 memory access vectors.
On average we have 500 task structure vectors, 500 system call vectors, and 200
memory access vectors per process.
Table 3.7: Example benign and malwares that were used to the accuracy of our
framework

Tested Benign
Ack-grep, grep, bmon, cat,
cbm, ethstatus,htop, ls, top,
htop, wget, fzf, fortune, bc, task

Tested Malwares
Backdoor c, dofloo,
linux.worm.lupper, sotdas, kaiten

Due to our ensemble approach, our framework relies on various machine learning
models, specifically one-class support vector machine, random forest, and logistic
regression per feature type. Using the same malware and benign processes, Table
3.8 compares the accuracy of each of our individual model using the same dataset
in order to demonstrate how our selected machine learning algorithms perform.
These results are the averages of each feature type (task structure, system calls, and
memory access) for each respective model.
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Table 3.8: Comparison of the accuracy of our models for each of our extracted
feature types

One-Class SVM
Random Forest
Logistic Regression

Task Structure
Accuracy
84%
98%
65%

System Call
Accuracy
93%
99%
98%

Memory Access
Accuracy
83%
89%
89%

Table 3.9 depicts the total average accuracy and speed of each of our machine
learning model algorithms over all three feature types. We took our benigns and
malwares and observed the average accuracy of each feature type for each given
model. We further recorded the average speed it took to make a determination. The
short time to determination we observed with the one-class support vector machine
supports our use of that machine learning model as a first stage classifier as the first
stage is required to be a rapid and robust anomaly detector. The increased accuracy
of the random forest supports our use of it as a in-depth classifier.
Table 3.9: Average accuracy and speed of our models over all three techniques

One-Class SVM
Random Forest
Logistic Regression

Average Accuracy
85.67%
95.33%
84.51%

Average Milliseconds
.0451
.0858
.0902

To improve upon our frameworks accuracy and robustness, rather than classifying a process as a whole, we implemented the use of sliding windows. These sliding
windows consist of chunks of our extracted features of a process and are passed
in similar fashion to our one-class support vector machine and anomalies are then
passed to our two classification models. By classifying a process in chunks rather
than as a whole, we were able to make earlier determinations as to whether a process was benign or malicious. Furthermore, delayed execution of malicious activity
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eventually fell into a sliding window as we iterated through the extracted features
and registered as anomalous, increasing our chances of detecting malicious activity.
The use of sliding windows also allows us to continuously monitor an executing application and classify smaller chunks of data rather than a process as a whole which
results in less computation.
Each sliding window can also have a threshold with which judgement is made
upon the window as a whole. For instance, a sliding window of ten records can be
said to have a threshold of 80% if eight evaluated records are determined to be benign
and thus the whole window determined to be benign. We tested varying window
sizes while testing each with a threshold of percent benign to percent malware within
each window. The sliding window sizes tested were five, ten, twenty, fifty, and one
hundred. The thresholds tested were ninety, eighty, seventy, and sixty. This means
that if the percent of benign vectors within the sliding window was determined to
exceed the threshold then that whole sliding window is now classified as benign
due to the prevailing percentage. An excerpt of this is shown in Figure 3.1 which
depicts the varying accuracy depending on threshold for sliding window sizes five,
ten, twenty, fifty, and one hundred. In other words, different sliding windows are
more accurate with certain thresholds. The results depicted in Figure 3.1 are the
averages from all three of our feature types (task structure, system calls, and memory
access) using the same benign and malicious processes in Table 3.7 in order to test
the overall accuracy of various sliding window sizes and thresholds. We tested our
benigns and malwares using a sliding window of five with the various thresholds and
averaged the results of our models. We repeated our tests over the same dataset but
with different thresholds and window sizes in order for the dataset to remain our
constant. Figure 3.1 demonstrates that the accuracy of a sliding window is affected
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by the threshold selected for that sliding window and that each sliding window must
be carefully analyzed to determine its best accuracy setting.

Figure 3.1: Threshold Comparison for Varying Sliding Window Sizes
Each of our individual models proved to be accurate in classifying a malicious
process. Although our framework requires more training and testing, using probabilistic analysis, all three techniques are accounted for and a final determination can
be achieved. Coupled with the use of sliding windows and a dual-stage approach
for further accuracy, our framework shows great promise in determining when a
device is compromised. Table 3.10 depicts the average accuracy of all three of our
approaches for a given set of benign and malicious processes. Of note, the malware
sotdas was determined to be unknown by all three of our models and for the security
and integrity of our device, if a process if unknown or anomalous it is assumed to
be malicious.
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Table 3.10: Average accuracy of our models over our three feature types for two
benign and three malicious processes
bmon
ethstatus
kaiten
linux.worm.lupper
sotdas

Class
Benign
Benign
Malware
Malware
Malware

Ensemble OC-SVM
97.58% benign
98.42% benign
89.85% unknown
87.37% unknown
98.96% unknown

Ensemble Random Forest
96.72% benign
97.68% benign
93.94% malware
91.94% malware
86.41% malware

Ensemble Logistic Regression
96.39% benign
96.33% benign
92.12% malware
88.01% malware
85.73% malware

Average Detection
Benign
Benign
Malware
Malware
Malware

IoT devices tend to run a single CLI application on a dialect of Linux and as
such, our focus was on CLI applications. However, we further tested our models
against various popular graphical user interface applications within a our x86 Linux
system such as Chrome a web browser, VLC an audio player, Gimp a photo editor, and Skype a communications platform to ensure our models were accurate
when introduced to new applications. Our models exceeded our expectations and
accurately identified each of these as benign. However, a model trained purely on
command line interface (CLI) applications will have a more difficult time classifying
a benign graphical user interface (GUI) application as benign due to the difference
in behavior between a CLI and GUI application. For instance, GUI applications are
event driven whereas a CLI application usually performs their function once executed. This inherent difference in behavior results in models requiring more training
depending on their intended target application type, CLI or GUI.
Past research has shown that the individual use of task structure, system calls,
and memory access patterns are viable and effective approaches to the detection of
malicious activity [SBSF11] [CMK15b] [XRSM17]. Each individual approach has
its benefits and merits, however we explore the possible synergy of these approaches
to augment their benefits and increase the work required by a malicious actor to
circumvent each technique. Furthermore, we present this ensemble approach as a
dual-stage classification framework which uses a highly sensitive first stage and a
more in-depth analytical secondary stage.
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A promising factor of our approach is that it is dynamic enough to allow for
different window sizes and thresholds per deployed device for further usability in
distributed networks that run varying device models. In other words, device types
will have their own dual-machine learning system, customized to their respective
window size and threshold value.
To further improve our framework, we propose exploring other available task
structure features and system calls which can be used to train our model. Android
based devices should also be tested [XLQZ12] as well as windows based operating
systems [UGPL18a] and a complete cloud based solution for intrusion and compromise detection [HZB11].
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
Malware is proving to be more dangerous than ever before and with the ubiquity of deployed IoT devices it is increasingly difficult to determine which devices
have been maliciously compromised. We propose a framework which uses a dual
stage behavioral analysis approach with increased accuracy of detection by combining the observance of task structure features, system calls, and memory access
patterns into an ensemble approach. Coupled with a dual-stage anomaly detector
and classifier, our framework offers high accuracy and malware detection to determine the integrity of an IoT device. These approaches show success on a variety
of devices such as Windows, Linux, and Android. Various algorithms such as Support Vector Machines, Random Forest, and Logistic Regression have been tested
with varying yet promising accuracy when compared to Naive Bayes and Nearest
Centroid algorithms.
Furthermore, these machine learning based malware detectors have been shown
to require more work by a malicious actor in order to circumvent their detection.
Our model showed great accuracy with limited training data. This approach allows
a device to contain an embedded agent and extract key process data as the device
executes its tasks. Furthermore, the data could be transmitted as a collected vector
to a cloud framework for processing.
Within a multi-stage framework, the first, sensitive, anomaly detection stage
flags malicious executions and passes them to a secondary stage for a more in-depth
analysis and classification. Once the malicious activity is detected a device can
be halted or the task suspended from functioning within the network in order to
prevent further execution. Furthermore, once refined, this approach may work with
little overhead and interruption on the end device. This near real-time detection
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would detect various kinds of malware and could stop them before they complete
their execution even when a malware attempts to delay its execution to obfuscate
itself.
Our approach shows promise as it can be combined with other approaches for
more accuracy and a higher detection rate while also maintaining low battery and
CPU costs. It is our hope that as the rapid evolution of technology in our sociality increases so does our defensive and countermeasure capabilities. Malware
is attributed as the cause of massive data and integrity loss. Due to the dynamic
and aggressive nature of Malware we require dynamic, vigorous, and progressive
approaches to defend against such attacks.
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